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**INFORMATION REPORT**

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

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COUNTRY China/Korea

DATE DISTR. 19 June 1952

SUBJECT Background Information on the Chinese Communist  
Intervention in the Korean Conflict

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ACQUIRED [REDACTED]SUPPLEMENT TO  
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1. The Chinese Communist government had made plans to intervene in the Korean conflict at the opening of hostilities.
2. In May 1950 the Chinese Communist Army dispatched approximately 2,000 Korean veterans, who formerly served in the Communist army against the Chinese Nationalists, to the North-South Korean border. In May 1950 the unit was based at Kyōnip'o (125-37, 38-45) (YC-2792), and when the signal to attack was given on 25 June 1950 the unit moved south with the North Korean 4 Division.
3. In July 1950 this unit was divided into three battalions at Seoul. One battalion was sent to the eastern front, one to the western front, and one to the central front. The battalion on the western front was known as the 18 Regiment, 4 North Korean Division. This unit was to be allowed to communicate with the Chinese Communist army headquarters in Manchuria at Antung, by-passing North Korean military channels. The military success enjoyed by the North Korean army in the early stages of the war prompted KIM Il-sōng to disregard this agreement, and at his order the unit was integrated into the North Korean army with North Korean officers in command..
4. The commanding officer of the original Chinese Communist-sponsored unit related to a friend in the North Korean 4 Corps that the Chinese Communist army was displeased with the actions of KIM in this matter. A rift between KIM Il-sōng and MAO Tse-tung followed the integration of the Chinese Communist-trained unit into the North Korean army, and pro-Chinese Communist generals in the North Korean army took advantage of the situation to criticize the policies of KIM Il-sōng. This incident dampened the desire of the Chinese Communist army to dispatch troops to Korea. However, heavy Soviet political pressure, following the Inchon landing, caused MAO to commit large Chinese Communist units to the support of the North Korean army.

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5. In August 1950 the Chinese Communist 4 Field Army was alerted for action. The 4 Field Army had three armies massed on the Manchurian border as early as August.

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